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The Rise of Direct Democracy in 




In 2010 the Croatian Constitution was changed to lower the requirements for the implementation of 
direct democracy at the national level, in order to save the referendum on Croatia’s EU membership 
from possible failure. Since then, Croatia has witnessed a sharp increase in people’s initiatives 
that have managed to block a number of the government’s reform proposals. Therefore, the newly 
discovered appeal of direct democracy in Croatia has created a new environment for the operation 
of its representative democracy. Starting from theoretical notions, this paper analyses the practice 
of direct democracy in selected transitional countries, which could be instructive for Croatia. In its 
central part, the paper explores the obstacles that stand in the way of the efficient implementation 
of direct democracy in Croatia. 
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Introduction 
It is difficult not to acknowledge the potential of direct democracy in 
terms of empowering citizens, breaking political deadlocks, and further 
democratizing the political system, despite the frequent criticism levelled 
against it of being a tool for achieving populist agendas. There have been, 
however, almost as many experiences with direct democracy as there are 
democratic countries in the world, which makes the task of transferring 
best practices from abroad difficult. Furthermore, direct democracy may 
introduce instability into a political system and could easily be hijacked by 
interest groups using it as a veto instrument against the implementation 
of reforms. Therefore, the application of direct democracy in countries 
with a short democratic history often walks a thin line between being 
advantageous and disadvantageous for the political system. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how direct democracy has been 
implemented in Croatia in the period since its independence.1 Additionally, 
the paper examines the reasons behind the growing application of direct 
democracy in Croatia since 2010 and discusses perspectives on how 
to use it more efficiently in the future. It argues that direct democracy 
represents a useful instrument for improving the overall democratic quality 
of a given political system. However, it also stresses that direct democracy 
should be limited in such a way that it clearly serves as a supplement to 
representative democracy and not as a tool for its institutional weakening. 
In terms of methodology this paper primarily relies on a qualitative analysis 
of secondary sources such as academic articles and books. However, it 
also uses statistics on different referendums and legislative provisions. The 
method of comparative analysis is also applied with respect to the practice 
of direct democracy in selected transitional countries. Throughout the 
article, particular attention is paid to the chronology of events in order to 
determine the causes and effects of particular developments.  
1 The first draft of this paper was presented and debated at the workshop “Rethinking Representation? The Changing 
Environment for Parliamentary Democracy”, held at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna in March 2015. The 
event was organised within the project “PADEMIA – Erasmus Academic Network on Parliamentary Democracy in 
Europe”, financially supported by the European Union’s Erasmus+ Lifelong Learning Programme. IRMO was a partner 
institution on the PADEMIA project.
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The paper comprises five sections. Following the introduction, the next 
section analyses from a theoretical perspective the concept of direct 
democracy and its relationship to representative democracy. It presents 
definitions of the most important terms as well as other insights that are 
important in order to better understand the parts that follow. 
The subsequent section examines the practice of direct democracy in 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovenia. These countries were chosen due to the 
similarities of their socio-economic conditions with those in Croatia and 
because of their rich and distinctive experiences with the implementation 
of direct democracy. Out of all new EU member states, direct democracy 
in Slovenia has the strongest influence on the political system, which is 
why its experiences are relevant for this paper. The Lithuanian practice 
is important due to the fact that out of all the new EU member states 
the country’s legal system recognises the amplest variety of the different 
instruments of direct democracy. Finally, Hungary was chosen because 
the importance of direct democracy for the country’s political system has 
drastically changed on more than one occasion in the past 25 years.     
The main section is reserved for the analysis of direct democracy in Croatia. It 
shows that for Croatian political elites the strengthening of direct democracy 
was never a goal in itself. Rather, this development in Croatia merely 
represented an inevitable technical side-effect of the EU accession process. 
The section examines the changing conditions for the implementation of 
the referendums and the initiatives (also known as the people’s initiatives), 
which since 2010 have allowed for the successful challenging of a number of 
the government’s reform proposals. It also critically analyses the provisions of 
the most recent attempt at changing the national Law on the Referendum, 
focusing on its advantages and shortcomings. Finally, the concluding section 
sums up the most important insights and conclusions.
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Direct versus representative democracy 
Direct democracy concerns all constitutional and other regulations 
through which citizens of one country or a sub-national unit are allowed, 
through voting independently and directly, to decide on a specific 
political question or to place it on the agenda (Kost 2008: 10). In other 
words, direct democracy denotes a variety of processes and institutions 
that guarantee people’s direct involvement in political decision-making 
(Maduz 2010: 1). For Butler and Renney (1978), from the government’s 
perspective there are three principle reasons for using the instruments 
of direct democracy: (i) constitutional obligation, (ii) increasing the 
legitimacy of decision making and (iii) transposing difficult decisions to 
the people in order to avoid being held accountable for their effects.
Having in mind the situation in Switzerland, Vatter (2000) classifies the 
different instruments of direct democracy by using a two principle criteria. 
Firstly, he distinguishes whether these instruments are initiated by a simple 
government majority or by a minority of representatives or citizens. 
Secondly, he observes whether they use a simple popular majority as 
a decision rule or a minority veto (ibid: 175). Reflecting on the Croatian 
experience with direct democracy, Smerdel (2013: 164–165) distinguishes 
referendums: i) according to the size of the political community (state or 
local referendums); ii) according to the matter which is being decided 
(whether it is a constitutional referendum, legislative referendum, 
referendum on association or dissociation, or referendum on other issues); 
iii) according to the legal nature of the referendum question (obligatory 
or consultative) and iv) according to who initiated it (a referendum 
following a decision of a state body or a referendum that is a product of 
the people’s initiative). 
According to Jung (2001) and Merkel (2014) there are three principle 
instruments of direct democracy, depending on the initiation criteria (see 
Figure 1). The first category refers to initiatives which can be launched 
through obtaining support from the prescribed number of citizens. The 
initiatives can further be broken down to legal initiatives (initiated from 
civil society) and referendum initiatives (initiated by those who govern, 
usually the opposition MPs). Both legal and referendum initiatives fall 
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under the category of initiatives, because in each case their initiation 
depends on the collection of a prescribed number of signatures. The 
second category is a referendum that can be initiated by the government 
or the parliament. Thirdly, there is the obligatory referendum, which is 
launched automatically whenever a decision needs to be made on a 
prescribed constitutional or some other legal question. The referendums 
and obligatory referendums can both be sub-divided into decision-
making referendums and compliance referendums. The basic distinction 
between initiatives on one side and referendums on the other will be used 
as the framework for analysis in the rest of this article, due to its applicability 
to the circumstances in transitional countries.
Figure 1. Instruments of direct democracy
Sources: Jung (2001) and Merkel (2014), slightly modified.
Reflecting on the effects of the referendums and initiatives, Möckli 
(1994) notes that while the former has a stabilizing effect on the political 
system, the opposite is usually true with respect to the latter. In his view, 
initiatives weaken the positions of political parties and strengthen those 
of interest groups. Furthermore, they have legitimizing effects on the 
political system (ibid). 
As indicated in the definition, direct democracy can be implemented at 
the national and at the sub-national (local) level, and quantitatively most 
experiences with direct democracy concern the latter. However, it is not 
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easy to compare national and local experiences because, at the local level, 
the range of issues that can be decided through initiatives or referendums is 
very limited. Furthermore, in terms of content, exercises in direct democracy 
at the local level tend to be less important (Schmitt 2014: 65).
Direct democracy represents a political instrument that operates within 
a larger framework of representative democracy and, as such, it covers 
just a small part of legislative decision-making (Kost 2008: 12; Merkel 2014: 
5). Still, the relationship between direct and representative democracy is 
not free of controversy due to questions concerning legitimacy. As a rule, 
referendums attract fewer voters than elections, which raises the question 
of their legitimacy in a situation where the decision taken through a 
referendum opposes the view taken by the government or the position of 
its majority in the parliament (Merkel 2014: 8).2
In the given setting the adequate thresholds, in terms of percentage or the 
number of voters, represents an issue of much significance. This concerns 
both the minimal number of citizen signatures that need to be collected 
for the initiation of initiatives as well as the thresholds with respect to the 
percentage of citizens casting their votes that are required. Concerning 
the latter, a differentiation can be made between the participation 
quorum and the acceptance quorum. While the participation quorum 
prescribes a minimal turnout of voters in order for the initiative or 
referendum to be considered legal, the acceptance quorum makes the 
legality of the voting dependent upon the acceptance of a proposal by 
a certain percentage of voters (Podolnjak 2014: 216). The overall concern 
with the thresholds is that if they are set too low, there is a legitimacy 
problem vis-à-vis representative democracy. If, on the other hand, the 
thresholds are set too high, the flow of innovative bottom-up initiatives 
could be obstructed (Merkel 2014: 10). The examples that will be analysed 
in this article will show that participation quorums of 50% or more should 
be avoided because they make direct democracy almost impossible. 
From the classical authors the strongest advocate for direct democracy 
was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his seminal work The Social Contract 
2 Croatian experiences support this claim. For example, in the 2011 parliamentary elections the voter turnout was 66.57% 
and in 2015 it was 60.82% (SECC 2011; SECC 2015). Such solid voter turnout can be contrasted with the much lower 
turnout in the latest national level referendum/initiative. In 2012 the referendum on EU membership had a turnout of 
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Rousseau prizes a vision of individuals that are directly involved in the 
creation of the laws that will govern their lives. However, Rousseau’s 
concept of direct democracy is not in compliance with the reality of 
contemporary states and the modern notion of representative 
democracy (see Vospernik 2014: 23–25). Among 20th century classical 
authors opposition to direct democracy was widely shared. Schumpeter 
(1962) claimed that the average voter lacks the competence and 
political interest to participate directly in decision-making processes. He 
also argued that referendums contribute to the polarization of society. 
An additional claim was that direct democracy leads to policies 
that could be harmful to minority groups. This argument was often 
quoted by Sartori (1992) who criticized referendums for their exclusive 
character. In his opinion referendums leave no space for negotiations 
and compromises. As such, they represent instruments of majoritarian 
democracy, which neglect or even endanger minorities. 
Contemporary researchers of direct democracy often rightly 
challenge these classical claims. Referring to the standpoint that the 
average voter lacks competence, Bowler (2013: 1789) notes that the 
distinction between representative democracy, on one side, and direct 
democracy, on the other, is somewhat artificial since most actions within 
the framework of direct democracy tend to be strongly influenced 
by MPs. There are studies showing that voters are capable of making 
reasonable decisions despite all the shortcomings of direct democracy 
in terms of its effects on efforts to build a consensus and the quality 
of the deliberations produced throughout campaigns (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). Scholars have presented evidence that as a result of 
direct democracy political outcomes correspond better with individual 
preferences (Hug 2004; Frey 1994). Similarly, there are studies showing 
that more frequent usage of direct democracy causes higher voter 
turnout, enhances citizen’s knowledge of politics (Smith and Tolbert 2004; 
Kriesi and Wisler 1996), creates a more engaged citizenry (Boehmke and 
Bowen 2010), and reduces protest behaviour (Fatke and Freitag 2013). 
Finally, citizens are more likely to be satisfied with how democracy works 
if there are possibilities for their direct participation in political processes 
(Bernauer and Vatter 2012). The argument that direct democracy leads 
to the introduction of policies that could be harmful to minority groups 
has also been contested. Authors have indicated that, in accordance 
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with the recommendations of the Venice Commission, many countries 
exclude such and other sensitive issues form direct voting by citizens 
(Podolnjak 2014: 211; Kaučič 2014: 75; Council of Europe 2007: III 3).  
Still, direct democracy should not be idealised despite all of its possible 
contributions to the further democratization of a certain political system. It 
should be kept in mind that the primary actors in direct democratic campaigns 
are always political elites, civil society groupings or individuals, and not “the 
people” as such (Merkel 2014: 14). In Switzerland, the cradle of modern-day 
direct democracy, initiatives and referendums make a significant contribution 
to political stability. However, direct democracy in Switzerland is much more 
organized and linked to procedures of representative democracy than is 
the case in Central and Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, where 
direct democracy does not have a long tradition (Maduz 2010: 2). A further 
problem is that revisions of direct democratic decisions are difficult to achieve. 
In other words, direct democratic procedures lack a correction mechanism 
that would be comparable with the right of citizens to vote the government 
out of office (Merkel 2014: 19).3 Last but not least, there are those who claim 
that an increased use of direct democracy compromises the conditions that 
facilitate the successful growth of the economy because it bestows interest 
groups with the power to slow down reform processes (Borner and Rentsch 
1997; Merkel 2014: 16). 
Direct democracy can strengthen a democratic political system because 
it can enable the political system to move closer to the democratic ideal. 
However, in order for citizens’ direct voting to be beneficial for democracy 
it has to be very precisely coordinated with the representative system, 
which is currently not the case in Croatia and most other Central and 
Eastern European countries. Furthermore, it is crucial to treat direct 
democracy as a supplement of representative democracy and to use it 
for determining only the most important issues.
3 For example, according to the Croatian Law on the Referendum (Art. 8) the decisions reached by means of direct 
democracy cannot be changed by representative bodies for a year and the voting cannot be repeated for six 
months. However, the problem lies in the fact that a one-year suspension on a possibility of changing the decision 
by representative bodies does not apply to referendums on alliances or the dissolution of alliances with other states 
and to popular initiatives. Concerning referendums on alliances or their dissolution the existing exception is adequate 
because it is in line with the Croatian Constitution (Art. 142) which indicates that such decisions cannot be changed 
unilaterally by state bodies. On the other hand, concerning popular initiatives things are not as simple. The inexistence 
of a one-year suspension poses a dilemma of when a decision reached by means of an initiative could be changed 
by a representative body. One possible answer is that it may never be changed which could hardly withstand 
legal scrutiny because that would undermine the power of a parliament to create and change the laws and the 
constitution. The other answer would be that a decision reached by means of a popular initiative could be changed 
immediately after its enactment. From a legal perspective this represents a better solution, but it leaves us with the 
question of what is then the purpose of having such legally binding initiatives in the first place.
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Direct democracy in selected transitional countries 
Hungary
The Hungarian political system is usually called dualistic because the 
government and the single chamber parliament do not possess the usual 
powers over each other. The government has no power to dissolve the 
parliament, while the parliament has no power to recall individual ministers 
(Machos 2002). The country has a combined electoral system with a 
preponderant proportion of majoritarian mandates, which strengthens the 
position of two big parties (Vospernik 2014: 554). Since the end of socialism 
the rules for the application of direct democracy in Hungary have been 
thoroughly changed on several occasion by means of either legislative 
changes or rulings of the Constitutional Court (ibid: 558).
At the beginning of the transition period the conditions for the 
implementation of direct democracy were rather favourable. The 
parliament itself could initiate a people’s initiative on almost any question 
as long as one third of its representatives supported the proposal. The 
decision reached on the referendum bound the parliament for two years. 
The only (though important) restrictive element in the implementation of 
direct democracy was a participation quorum of at least 50% (Komáromi 
2013: 48). 
Throughout the 1990s the Constitutional Court, through its rulings, tried 
to better regulate the implementation of direct democracy. This activity 
influenced the 1997 constitutional and legislative changes to the Law on 
the Referendum, which introduced a more precise system (Vospernik 
2014). Through this reform the number of signatures by citizens that had to 
be collected in order to successfully implement initiatives was increased 
to 200.000 in most cases. The time span for the collection of signatures was 
limited to four months when the initiative was started by those who govern 
and two months when citizens initiate it. The list of prohibited issues that 
cannot be decided by means of direct citizen voting was enlarged. For 
example, it was forbidden to hold a referendum or initiative concerning 
the dissolution of the national and local parliaments, the Law on the 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (77) - 2017
48
Referendum, the forming of the government, a declaration of war, military 
interventions, and amnesty. Additionally, a control system for initiatives was 
established by means of a validation procedure in the National Election 
Committee. Finally, and most importantly, the 1997 reform replaced the 
50% participation quorum with a 25% approval quorum, which resulted in 
an increased use of direct democracy (Komáromi 2013).
The next significant reform was implemented in 2011 with the clear 
intention of narrowing the possibility for implementing direct democracy. 
On that occasion, some forms of initiatives were abolished, such as those 
that obliged the parliament to discuss problems found to be important 
by 50.000 citizens. Furthermore, the right of parliamentarians to announce 
national referendums was restricted, which disrupted the balance of 
power between the parliament and the government in favour of the latter. 
Arguably, the most important change concerned the re-introduction of 
the 50% participation quorum (László 2016; Pállinger 2014). 
The 2011 changes could be viewed in the context of a desire to stabilize 
the political system, at the expense of further democratic developments. 
Namely, most initiatives used to be initiated or supported by the opposition 
with the clear intention of destabilizing the government. Only one initiative 
(from 2004 concerning double citizenship for Hungarians that do not live in 
Hungary) has not been initiated by a political party (Vospernik 2014: 577). 
This development corresponds with the classic observation that leaders of 
political parties tend to favour direct democracy when in opposition but 
attempt to limit its scope when in power (Frey 2003). Furthermore, it could 
be concluded that in Hungary after the politically important referendums 
on accession to NATO (1997) and the EU (2003) the need for preserving 
the low participation quorum lost relevance (Vospernik 2014: 567–568). 
An additional problem in Hungary is that there are no institutional 
preconditions for developing a dialogue between representative and 
direct democracy. In case 200.000 signatures are collected, the parliament 
has to schedule voting on the initiative. However, it cannot issue a 
counterproposal, and it does not have to make a statement or debate the 
initiative (Pállinger 2014). The lack of regulations concerning the financing 
of referendums and initiatives is also problematic (László 2016).
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Through the referendum on mandatory migrant quotas held in October 
2016 the Hungarian government tried to legitimise its own controversial 
policy towards migrants within the EU. It is, however, questionable whether 
in circumstances of widespread anti-migrant sentiments the equality 
between supporters and opponents of the proposal could have been 
respected, as recommended by the Venice Commission in its Code of 
Good Practice on Referendums (Council of Europe 2007: I 2).4
Lithuania
The political system of Lithuania represents a unique combination of 
presidential and parliamentary elements. The president of the republic 
possesses competences in the domain of foreign policy and has strong 
influence with respect to choosing the head persons for the numerous 
governmental bodies. Additionally, the president fulfils an important 
role in the legislative process; through his/her veto powers, law initiation 
powers, and the right to demand changes to draft laws (Vospernik 
2014: 429). The parliamentary representatives are elected through a 
combined electoral system with an equal proportion of majoritarian 
and proportional mandates, but despite this the country has one of 
the most fragmented party scenes in Europe (Somer 2012: 86). The 
government is one-sidedly dependent on a single chamber parliament 
and parliamentarians have massive influence over the government’s 
agenda (Vospernik 2014).
Ever since the country’s independence in 1991, the Law on the 
Referendum has experienced numerous modifications. However, 
these changes have not led to drastic shifts with respect to the 
implementation of direct democracy, because the basic parameters 
have stayed mostly unchanged (Somer 2012). Unlike in some other 
countries, there are no restrictions on the issues that can be decided 
by means of direct democracy and a decision reached by the direct 
voting of citizens cannot be changed in the parliament. Additionally, 
there are rather favourable conditions for starting an initiative by the 
opposition MPs. A referendum initiative could be initiated by one fourth 
of the MPs, and in fact 50% of all implemented initiatives were initiated 
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by the opposition. 
Still, in Lithuania there are many serious obstacles to the efficient 
implementation of referendums and initiatives, such as the very high 
threshold for participation and the short time for the collection of 
signatures (Vospernik 2012). With respect to national level initiatives, in 
most cases it is necessary to collect 300.000 citizens’ signatures (11.4% 
of the electorate) in three months. Furthermore, there is a participation 
quorum of at least 50% of voters (ibid: 439), which applies to all 
instruments of direct democracy (see Figures 2 and 3).
In 2003 the high participation quorum caused fear among Lithuania’s 
political class that the EU membership referendum might not pass. 
Therefore, the participation quorum for the referendums that deal with 
the transfer of sovereignty to international organizations was lowered 
to 33%. Ultimately, this action proved unnecessary, because 63% of the 
total electorate voted in the EU membership referendum and the yes 
vote took 91%, which is 57% of the total electorate (Somer 2012: 82). 
The Lithuanian legal system altogether recognises nine different 
instruments of direct democracy, but not all forms have been used 
in practice (Vospernik 2014: 441). Additionally, the success rate is 
rather poor, because only five referendums and initiatives reached full 
implementation (CECRL 2016). 
Slovenia
The Slovenian political system corresponds to Lijphart’s (1999) consensus 
model of democracy. This implies a high number of effective parties 
(4.99), comparatively low executive dominance (average duration 
of the government is 1.7 years), pronounced bicameralism, a rigid 
constitution, and a strong role reserved for the Constitutional Court 
(Vospernik 2014: 389). The strength of the country’s legislative branch 
is also visible from the fact that the prime minister cannot replace any 
of his ministers without the parliament’s approval. Additionally, neither 
the president nor the prime minister possesses the power to dissolve 
the parliament, whose members are elected through a proportional 
electoral system (ibid: 391). 
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The 1991 Slovenian Constitution and the 1994 Law on the Referendum 
envisaged a strong role for direct democracy. They granted the right of 
ordering a legislative veto referendum via the initiative of one third of 
the parliamentarians without any participation quorum. Moreover, until 
2012 the participation quorum did not apply to any type of referendum 
or initiative, with the exception of constitutional referendums initiated 
by one third of the parliamentarians, where the participation of voters 
was prescribed at 50% (Kaučič 2014). Consequently, it must be stressed 
that the average turnout for referendums and initiatives is 36.27%, 
which is almost half that of the average turnout for the parliamentary 
elections (Vospernik 2014: 414). The number of signatures from citizens 
that need to be collected for an initiative is not set to be excessively 
high (40.000 in a country of a 2 million). However, the unfavourable 
elements refer to the time span provided for collection (30–45 days), 
and the fact that signatures need to be collected in the offices of the 
local administration (Kaučič 2014). 
The generally favourable conditions for the implementation of direct 
democracy in Slovenia resulted in 76% of referendums and initiatives 
being decided in accordance with the wishes of their initiators 
(Vospernik 2012: 414). In the period between 1990 and 2015, 24 national 
referendums and initiatives were successfully implemented (see Figures 
2 and 3), which is more than in any other transitional country (CECRS 
2016). There were 15 successfully implemented initiatives, out of which 
eight were started by the opposition MPs, underlining the importance of 
the opposition in the implementation of direct democracy. Therefore, 
it could be concluded that direct democracy in Slovenia creates a 
second centre of power that oscillates around the opposition (Vospernik 
2014: 419). According to Vospernik (2014: 411), the 2003 NATO and EU 
accession referendums were among the few that obtained broad 
support from almost all political parties and succeeded in obtaining 
high voter turnouts (NATO 60.43%, EU 60.44%). 
In 2012 Slovenia initiated constitutional changes aimed at re-regulating 
the implementation of direct democracy. Changes were introduced 
aimed at somewhat restricting its implementation. Accordingly, the 
right of one third of the parliamentarians (30 MPs) and of the second 
house of the Slovenian Parliament to start initiatives vetoing legislative 
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proposals was abolished (Kaučič 2014: 70). This action was said to be 
necessary for the coherent application of the principle that only voters 
should be granted the right to demand direct voting, since they do 
not directly participate in the legislative process (Podolnjak 2015). For 
Igor Kaučič this was a welcome move because it limited the possibility 
of using direct democracy for settling differences between political 
parties or political differences between the two houses of the Slovenian 
Parliament (2014: 73). 
Legislative referendums and initiatives became conditioned on the 
participation of at least 20% of voters. More precisely, a quorum of 
rejection was introduced according to which a law would be rejected 
through the referendum if at least 20% of citizens voted against it 
(Podolnjak 2015). Last but not least, certain issues were excluded from 
being decided through direct democracy, such as laws concerning: 
urgent matters to ensure the defence of the state, consequences of 
national disasters, taxes, custom duties and other compulsory charges, 
state budgets, ratification of treaties, as well as the elimination of 
unconstitutionality in the area of human rights (Kaučič 2014). However, 
it must be underlined that all financial and budget laws were not 
excluded from direct voting but only those precisely listed, which are 
considered to be crucial for the financial stability of the country (ibid).
The implemented constitutional changes did not have drastic effects on 
the practice of direct democracy in Slovenia, because, in comparison 
to other countries, the conditions were still rather favourable. However, 
the adopted higher level of precision is expected to limit the influence of 
the Constitutional Court, which in the past had frequently intervened in 
matters concerning direct democracy, claiming that unconstitutional 
consequences might result (Ribičič 2014: 64). 
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Figure 2. Number of fully implemented national level referendums and 
initiatives 1990–20155
Sources:
1. SECC - State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, 2016. Elections/Referendums Archives in 
Chronological Order, [online] Available at: http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html?documentId=A758299
505B80F02C1257C8400606C3B [accessed 1 December 2016].
2. CECRL - Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016. Previous Referendums, 
[online] Available at: http://www.vrk.lt/en/ankstesni [accessed 1 December 2016].
3. National Election Office of Hungary, 2016. National Referendum, [online] Available at: http://valasztas.
hu/en/ref2016/index.html [accessed 1 December 2016]; Vospernik (2014: 571).
4. CECRS - Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016. Referendums, [online]
Available at: http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-referendumi [accessed 1 December 2016]. 
Figure 3. Number of failed national level referendums and initiatives 
1990–2015 due to inability of reaching the prescribed quorums 
Sources:
1. see Table 3. 
2. CECRL - Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016. Previous Referendums, 
[online] Available at: http://www.vrk.lt/en/ankstesni [accessed 1 December 2016].
3. National Election Office of Hungary, 2016. National Referendum, [online] Available at: http://valasztas.
hu/en/ref2016/index.html [accessed 1 December 2016]; Vospernik (2014: 571).
4. CECRS - Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016. Referendums, [online] 
Available at: http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-referendumi [accessed 1 December 2016].
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Croatia’s democracy in the age of referendums 
A chronology of the national and local referendums
Before going into the details of how direct democracy is implemented in 
Croatia it is important to set it in a wider context by shortly describing the 
features of Croatia’s representative democracy. The Croatian Constitution 
(Art. 71–72) prescribes a unicameral parliament, which is elected every 
four years. The Law on the Election of Members of the Croatian Parliament 
(LEMCP) defines the electoral system as proportional (Art. 40), whereby 
citizens elect 140 MPs in ten territorial units (Art. 38). Additional MPs are 
elected in a special constituency for Croatian citizens living abroad as 
well as a constituency for ethnic minorities within Croatia as a whole 
(Art. 44 and 45). The changes to the LEMCP imposed in February 2015 
introduced the possibility of preferential voting. The candidates that 
obtained more than 10% of preferential votes within any particular list 
are given the advantage over all other candidates regardless of their 
numerical position on the list (Art. 16 and 38). 
According to the Croatian Constitution (Art. 87) the Croatian Parliament 
can initiate national level referendums concerning constitutional changes, 
the adoption of new laws, or any other issue in the area of its jurisdiction. 
Referendums can also be initiated by the president of the republic on 
the proposal of the government and with the co-signature of the prime 
minister. However, in such cases, the Constitution limits the thematic scope 
of a referendum to constitutional changes and issues that are important 
for the independence, unity, and existence of Croatia. The decisions 
produced through the referendums are made by a majority of the voters 
taking part therein and they are obligatory for the government (Croatian 
Constitution, Art. 87; LoR, Art. 6 and Art. 8). However, the Constitution (Art. 
87) and the Law on the Referendum (LoR) in articles 57–59 also prescribe 
for the possibility of a consultative referendum. 
Local level referendums are regulated by the LoR and the Law on the 
Local and the Regional Self-government (LLRS). According to the LoR 
(Art. 4) local referendums can be initiated by representative bodies of the 
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local and regional self-government on issues that concern their areas of 
responsibility. According to the LLRS, local referendums can be initiated on 
the proposal of a mayor, a municipal perfect, a county perfect, one third 
of the county council members, or one half of the town or municipality 
council members (LLRS, Art. 24). A proposal for a local referendum needs 
to be confirmed by the majority of representatives of the local/regional 
representative body (LLRS, Art. 24). The LoR (Art. 11) prescribes that both 
national and local referendums need to be implemented in no less than 
20 and no more than 40 days since the announcement of this decision. 
Until 2010 the development of direct democracy at the national level was 
halted by very restrictive implementation requirements. Accordingly, both 
the optional constitutional as well as the legislative referendums required a 
participation quorum of at least 50% of all voters registered in the country. 
The requirements for the implementation of the obligatory constitutional 
referendum, reserved for association and dissociation, were even stricter, 
stipulating the acceptance (or refusal) quorum of least 50% of all registered 
voters (Grubiša 2012: 55). In such circumstances it is not surprising that 
throughout its newest history Croatia has implemented just two national 
referendums and one national initiative: a referendum on the country’s 
independence, a referendum on its EU membership, and an initiative 
concerning the constitutional definition of marriage (see Tables 1 and 3). 
Anticipating a low turnout for the EU referendum, based on public opinion 
surveys (Širinić 2011), in 2010 the requirements for the implementation of 
direct democracy at the national level were lowered, in order to save 
the EU referendum from possibly failing. This was done by means of 
constitutional changes, supported by all major parties, which abolished 
the requirements for any specific participation quorum at the national level 
(Art. 87 and Art. 135). This example proves the old hypothesis that direct 
democracy may have indirect effects on the political elite by fostering 
consensus with respect to the decision-making process (Neidhart 1970). 
Ultimately, as indicated in the previous section, similar developments were 
registered in Hungary and Lithuania, prior to their accession to the EU. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Law on Implementation of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Croatia (CLICRC) noted that within a period of six months 
the LoR should be harmonized with the Constitution (Art. 7). Despite this, 
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to this date the LoR has not been changed, which has had paradoxical 
implications for the implementation of direct democracy in the country. 
Namely, while at the national level there is no longer a participation 
quorum, at the local level (see Tables 2 and 4) the participation quorum 
of 50% of locally registered voters still holds (LoR, Art. 6). 
The results of the EU referendum held on 22 January 2012 showed that 
the concerns of political elites over the extent of citizens’ support for EU 
membership were justified. In the referendum, 66.3 per cent of citizens 
voted in favour of accession with a turnout of only 43.5 per cent (see 
Table 1). Such results were in contrast to the advice offered by the majority 
of parliamentary political parties and their MPs, which overwhelmingly 
expressed their unreserved support for EU membership and exhorted 
citizens to vote for accession (Butković 2015). Clear opposition to EU 
membership was expressed by only one conservative right-wing party, 
which at the time had one seat in the parliament (ibid). This confirms that 
in Croatia, just as elsewhere in the EU, the MPs tend to be more supportive 
of the Union than the voters (Auel and Raunio 2012: 20).
Table 1. National level referendums
No. TOPIC OF THE REFERENDUM DATE OF VOTING






1. Independence of Croatia 19.05.1991. Obligatory 83.56%
93.24% for 
4.15 % against 
1.18% non-valid





1. RCIR - Republic Commission for Implementation of Referendums, 1991. Referendum on the status of 
Republic of Croatia, [online] 19 May. Available at: http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html?documentId=D
F2CA3FEF99BA5CBC1257C5C004BF6B4  [accessed 1February 2017].
2. SECC – State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, 2012. Referendum on the EU membership, 
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Table 2. Local level referendums6
No. TOPIC OF THE REFERENDUM TOWN
DATE OF 
VOTING

























of  thermal 
power plant
Ploče 25.01.2015. Consultative 60.4% 90.79% against
Sources: 
1. SECC – State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, 1996. Consultative referendums on 
corrections of the county borders, [online]  Available at: http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html?docume
ntId=DF2CA3FEF99BA5CBC1257C5C004BF6B4 [accessed 1 February 2017].
2. Oršić, Z., 2014. Lokalni referendum u Hrvata. Pollitika.com, [online] Available at: http://pollitika.com/
lokalni-referendumi-u-hrvata [accessed 1February2017].
3. Jutarnji list, 2015a. Ploče – više od 90% Pločana protiv termoelektrane, [online] 25 January. Available at: 
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ploce-vise-od-90-posto-plocana-protiv-termoelektrane/469261/
[accessed 1 February 2017].
Opening Pandora’s Box of initiatives
Initiatives were introduced into Croatia’s political system in the year 2000, 
when, as part of the constitutional changes brought after the death of 
Franjo Tuđman, Croatia’s first president, the country’s semi-presidential 
political system was transformed into a parliamentary system. According 
to these changes the Croatian Parliament was obliged to announce an 
initiative on any topic from its scope of work or of importance for Croatia 
if this was requested by at least 10 per cent of registered voters (Croatian 
Constitution, Art. 87; LoR, Art. 3). Just as with the referendums discussed 
in the previous section, the decisions reached through initiatives are 
made by a majority of the voters taking part therein and they are binding 
(Croatian Constitution, Art. 87; LoR, Art. 6 and Art. 8).7
6 In Croatia, there is no official data on the exact number of local referendums and initiatives held so far. Therefore, it is 
possible that the presented data is incomplete. Concerning the referendums under No. 1. these were held in Pag and 
Novalja district, Zagreb county, Novska, Ivanič Grad, Kloštar Ivanić district, Križ district, Našice, Đurđenovac district, 
Feričanci district and Podgorač district.
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The introduction of initiatives in Croatia has often been criticized as overly 
simplistic and for not being sufficiently thought-through. Legislators failed 
to introduce a differentiation between the criteria for initiatives that pursue 
constitutional changes and those that demand legislative ones (in terms 
of the number of collected signatures, the length of time for collecting 
them, etc.). A practice of prohibiting instruments of direct democracy 
during the last year of the government’s mandate as well as within the 
first six months in office was not accepted. Last but not least, prescribing 
a time frame of only 15 days for collecting signatures for initiatives was 
viewed as equally problematic (Pereša and Zelić 2012; Kostadinov 2014; 
Smerdel 2014; Podolnjak 2014).
The 15-day timeframe for collecting the signatures of about 430.000 
citizens at the national level (10% of registered voters) means that without 
massive organisational capacities on the part of the organizers, national 
level initiatives have no chance of succeeding. As seen from Table 3, there 
were more national level initiatives that failed in collecting the required 
signatures than successful ones. Additionally, the rigorous 15-day timeframe 
stands in sharp contrast to the undetermined time period that, according 
to the LoR, the Ministry of Public Administration has for their validation. In 
practice this means that the government protracts the implementation of 
initiative if it suits its interests. Defects in the legislative framework regulating 
initiatives are also visible from the lack of precision in the LoR which allows 
the government to change the legislation, which is to be voted on, in the 
period between the initiative’s initiation and the actual voting (Periša and 
Zelić 2012). This opportunity has already been used by the government on 
three separate occasions (amendments of the Labour Law, outsourcing 
and monetization of the highways, see Table 3).
Just as for referendums, the implementation of initiatives at the local level 
is inhibited by the fact that in the post-2010 period, the LoR has not been 
harmonized with the constitution. For that reason, the success of local level 
initiatives and referendums depends on the turnout requirement of at least 
50% of the locally registered voters (LoR, Art. 6). As is visible from Table 4, 
such strict turnout requirements prevent the implementation of most local 
level initiatives. the LLRS (Art. 24) further specifies that local initiative can be 
initiated by 20% of the voters registered in the local or regional unit.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (77) - 2017
59
In the case of recalling the municipal prefect, mayor, county prefect, 
or their deputies, the LLRS (Art. 40c) notes that the voting is valid if the 
majority of voters that turned out voted for the recall and if that majority 
represents at least 1/3 of the total number of locally registered voters. 
This practically means that a turnout below 50% has only slim chances for 
success. Still, in terms of the timing within the recall procedure, the new 
LLRS goes one step further than the out-dated LoR. Unlike the LoR, which 
prescribes no limitations on when an initiative can be implemented, the 
LLRS notes that the recall procedure cannot be carried out within the first 
12 months after the local elections took place or within 12 months of the 
implementation of the previous such recall procedure. Similarly, the recall 
procedure is prohibited in the last year of the mandate (Art. 40b). 
The existing legislation reserves an important place for the Constitutional 
Court in the implementation of national level initiatives. The Constitutional 
Law on Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
(CLICRC) prescribed that with respect to national level initiatives, the 
Croatian Parliament can inquire the Constitutional Court about the 
compatibility between the question posed by the initiative and the 
Croatian Constitution. In such circumstances, the Court is obliged to 
provide its answer within 30 days (Art. 95). Local referendums are excluded 
from the scope of review of the Constitutional Court because of the strict 
wording of article 95 of the CLICRC, which expressly refers to referendums 
defined in article 87 (paragraphs 1–3) of the Croatian Constitution. 
The appropriateness of all questions posed by the local initiatives are 
examined by the Central Department of State Administration responsible 
for local and regional self-government. The Central Department also 
checks the validity of the collected signatures (LLRS, Art. 24). Within 60 
days the response regarding the appropriateness and validity of the 
signatures needs to be delivered (LLRS, Art. 24). 
The parliament used the opportunity to inquire the Constitutional Court 
about the appropriateness of the questions concerning four national level 
initiatives (amendments to the Labour Law, changing the Constitutional 
Law on the Rights of National Minorities, outsourcing and monetization 
of highways, see Table 3), which managed to collect the required 
number of signatures (CCRC 2010, CCRC 2014a, CCRC 2015a, CCRC 
2015b). Regarding amendments to the Labour Law, the Court stated 
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that a referendum would be unnecessary because in the meantime the 
government decided to abandon the proposal. In the remaining three 
cases the decision of the Court was that the question is unconstitutional 
(ibid). With respect to the 2013 initiative about the constitutional definition 
of marriage as a union between one woman and one man, the motion 
from the Parliament was never sent. Therefore, the Court offered its view 
through a special document under the title “Statement”. In this statement 
the Court declined to rule that the question was contrary to international 
and domestic law, which cleared the path for this (and so far the only) 
successfully implemented national level initiative (CCRC 2013).
The role of the Constitutional Court in regulating the instruments of direct 
democracy in Croatia is not without controversy. Some scholars have 
objected to the fact that the current legislative framework allows the 
Parliament to inquire the Court about the compatibility of national level 
initiatives with the Constitution but not national referendums. Therefore, 
it remains unclear, what would be the implications of an activity of the 
Constitutional Court in the case of national level referendums or initiatives, 
when the parliament avoids posing a question (Horvat-Vuković 2014; 
Podolnjak 2014). However, as pointed to by Gardašević (2015), from the 
point of view of the Constitutional Court itself, this question was resolved 
in the statement of the Court concerning the constitutional definition 
of marriage. There the Court revealed its approach to its own review 
powers, according to which it possesses the general constitutional duty to 
guarantee respect for the constitution and to supervise the constitutionality 
of state referendums, until the formal end of the referendum procedure.
The 2010 abolition of the participation quorum at the national level resulted 
in an increase of initiatives. At the local level, although rules remained 
unchanged, the frequency of initiatives increased as well, which could 
be attributed to the general growth of citizens’ interest in the instruments 
of direct democracy. 
National level initiatives can easily be divided into two principle groups: 
initiatives dealing with political issues and initiatives dealing with economic 
issues. However, there are observable differences between these two 
groups. While the organizers of initiatives dealing with political issues derive 
from different groups within civil society (from Christian conservatives and 
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war veterans to the pacifist groups) the organizers of the initiatives that 
focus on the economy are always the trade unions. The later possess 
organizational capacities that allow them to pursue successful signature 
collection campaigns. Through their engagement in initiatives aimed at 
blocking the government’s major economic reforms, which otherwise 
could have obtained majority backing in the Croatian Parliament, the 
trade unions in Croatia used the instruments of direct democracy to act 
as veto points on behalf of the status quo. 
One differentiation between the initiatives in Croatia and the ones in Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovenia is that in Croatia the opposition is not as frequently 
involved in the implementation of these initiatives, particularly at the national 
level. This phenomenon could partly be explained with the fact that, unlike 
in the mentioned countries, in Croatia the oppositional MPs cannot start a 
referendum initiative. Therefore, the opposition is generally not as familiar with 
the strategic use of direct democracy.8 Additionally, it is not surprising that the 
initiators of the initiatives that deal with the economy are the trade unions. As 
the most ardent advocates of leftist ideas in Croatia, the trade unions often 
claim to have no interlocutors among the political parties, which in their view 
almost exclusively follow the neoliberal agenda (Butković et al. 2012). 
8 The attitudes of the two major political parties (the social democrats and conservatives) towards direct democracy 
could generally be described as reactive and sceptical. This is best visible from their clear opposition to the initiative 
that was aimed at introducing preferential voting without census, the lowering of the election threshold and some 
other changes to the electoral system (see Table 3). In this initiative the leaderships of both major parties recognised 
the potential danger that their power might be eroded (Vuković 2014). 
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Table 3. National level initiatives9









































1. The initiative on the termination of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal was launched by war veterans who 
requested a direct vote on the regulation of their status in proceedings concerning the alleged war crimes (Portal 
hrvatskog kulturnog vijeća 2007). 
2. Concerning accession to NATO, an initiative was launched that requested a direct vote on that topic, which has 
not been envisaged (H-ALTER 2008). 
3. The initiative on arbitration of the Croatian-Slovenian border delimitation was targeted against the arbitration 
agreement which was signed by the two governments. The arbitration was to determine the land border 
delimitation between the two countries on several micro locations as well as the sea border in the Adriatic Sea. The 
organizers of this initiative claimed that Croatia needed to pull out of the arbitration agreement. They advocated 
settling of the border issue at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg or at the UN International 
Court of Justice in The Hague (Večernji list 2009). 
4. The trade union confederations started an initiative that would cancel the prolonged application of the expired 
collective agreements by means of amendments to the Labour Law. The government abandoned this proposal 
but later these changes were implemented by means of another law (Butković et al. 2012). 
5. The initiative also called “Referendum uprising” included the questions on the following issues: a second 
referendum on the EU membership, the annulment of the privatization process, a ban on GMOs, and a prohibition 
on the selling of natural resources (Tportal.hr 2013).
6. The constitutional definition of marriage initiative provoked significant debate concerning whether the 
conservation of cultural concepts such as marriage should have priority over individual autonomy (Gardašević 
2015: 10). Furthermore, the initiative provoked polemics on whether constitutional issues should be decided through 
the initiative process and whether the requirements should remain the same for legislative and constitutional 
initiatives (Podolnjak 2014). Finally, the Constitutional Court concluded that a decision made by a direct citizens’ 
vote has an immediate transformative effect on the constitutional text (Gardašević 2015: 11).
7. The initiative, which concerned changing the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, wanted 
to harden requirements for the official use of minority languages and scripts in the territories with local self-
government. The goal was to prevent the placing of bilingual (Latin and Cyrillic) plates on public buildings in the 
town of Vukovar, which has a significant Serbian minority. Organizers claimed that Cyrillic scripture in Vukovar is 
associated with suffering during the war, in which the town was destroyed (CCRC 2014a). 
8. After the government announced its plan to outsource all non-core services in the public sector the trade unions 
started an initiative that would ban outsourcing in the public sector by means of a special law. The Constitutional 
Court, with respect to this case, argued that direct democracy is permissible and legitimate, but not the primary 
and ordinary way of deciding on the regulation of economic, legal and political relations (CCRC 2015a). 
9. The greatest controversy over the initiative aimed at changing the electoral system was what number constitutes 
ten per cent of voters in Croatia. The initiative failed because the Constitutional Court took a position that ten per 
cent should be counted based only on the voters who reside in Croatia (CCRC 2014b). 
10. An initiative against the monetization of highways was started by a broad coalition of trade unions and civil society 
activists who wanted to stop the government’s plan to give the motorways, which are public property, to private 
concessioners (CCRC 2015b).
11. The organizers of this initiative wanted to lower the required number of signatures needed for the initiation of an 
initiative. Furthermore, they also wanted to prescribe that in all future attempts to regulate direct democracy the 
signatures for the initiatives must be collected in public places (Jutarnji list 2015b). 
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17.11.2013. 632.165 / / Unconstitutional question
8. A ban of  outsourcing 06.06.2014. 563.815 / /
Unconstitutional 
question
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Table 4. Local level initiatives10






FOR / AGAINST OUTCOME
1.
Location of the 
county’s waste 
disposal site





Senj 19.01.2003. 40.4% 92.5% for Insufficient turnout
3.
Separation 
from the Blato 
municipality
Babina 06.07.2003. 92% 96% for Successful
4.
Recall of the 
municipal 
prefect
Pribislavec 27.02.2011. 11% 70% for Insufficient turnout
5.











Lokve 09.06.2013. 37.8% 88.7% against Insufficient turnout
7.
Construction 
of wind power 
plant










Goričan 16.02.2014. 56.2% 97.7% against Successful
Source: Oršić, Z., 2014. Lokalni referendum u Hrvata. Pollitika.com, [online] Available at: http://pollitika.
com/lokalni-referendumi-u-hrvata [accessed 1 February 2017]
10 The initiative, which intended to block the construction of the Golf Park on the mount Srđ close to Dubrovnik, was one 
of the most media exposed local initiatives. The organizers were concerned, among other things, that this project 
could endanger the regular water supply to the city of Dubrovnik. However, like most of the local initiatives this one 
also failed to obtain the needed participation quorum (Srđ je naš 2016). 
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Towards better regulation of direct democracy in Croatia
In its October 2010 decision the Constitutional Court noted that the existing 
legislative arrangements that regulate direct democracy in Croatia lack 
coherence and need to be changed (CCRC 2010). Specifically, the Court 
noted that the Croatian Parliament is obliged to harmonize the LoR with 
the Croatian Constitution and that in doing so the legislator should take 
into account that the Court on two separate occasions had initiated a 
review of the LoR’s constitutionality. It further noted that provisions of the 
LoR are insufficiently elaborated, which is visible from the fact that there 
are no regulations on how to proceed when the government withdraws 
a proposal that is to be decided upon by means of an initiative. Finally, 
the Court stressed that provisions of the LoR need to be harmonized with 
the Code of Good Practice with Respect to Referendums issued by the 
Venice Commission.11
On a number of occasions MPs, experts, and civil society representatives 
demanded constitutional and legislative changes that would harmonize 
relations between the constitution and the LoR and make direct 
democracy more accessible. For example, in June 2010 representatives 
of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (then in the opposition) 
submitted a constitutional amendment aimed at lowering the number 
of signatures from citizens needed for the initiation of an initiative from 10 
to 5 per cent, and forbidding referendums/initiatives concerning human 
rights, basic freedoms, equality, the rights of the national minorities, as well 
as taxation and the state budget (Podolnjak 2014: 186). The amendment 
was not approved, just as the one submitted in October 2012 by 45 MPs, 
which called for the lowering of the number of signatures to 200.000 (ca. 
5%) and extending the time for their collection (ibid: 187). Similarly, the 
NGO GONG recommended lowering the number of signatures to 5% and 
extending the period for their collection to two months (Pereša and Zelić 
2012). Despite all this, it was not until September 2014 that the government 
headed by the social democrats proposed the new draft LoR. 
The new draft LoR corrects the inconsistency between the Constitution 
11 Council of Europe, 2007. Resolution 235. Code of Good Practice on Referendums (adopted by the Council for 
Democratic Elections and the Venice Commission), [online] 30 May. Available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.
jsp?p=&id=1133019&direct=true [accessed 1 February 2017]. 
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and the LoR by eliminating the participation quorum at the national 
level. Still, it keeps the participation quorum at the local level (although 
somewhat reduced). Transcribing provisions from the LLRS, the draft LoR 
notes that voting on a local referendum or initiative is valid only if a majority 
of the voters that voted for the proposal represent at least 1/3 of the total 
number of the locally registered voters (Art. 21). However, such a still high 
participation quorum makes the implementation of direct democracy at 
the local level very difficult. 
For the local level initiatives, the strict requirement of conferring signatures 
from at least 20% of locally registered voters was relaxed to 15% for the 
municipalities of 10.000 – 100.000 inhabitants and 10% for the municipalities 
of more than 100.000 inhabitants (Art. 9.). Finally, the time frame for the 
collection of signatures both at the national and at the local level was set 
at 30 days (Art. 14).  
The new draft LoR attempted to abolish the practice of collecting citizens’ 
signatures in public places. Instead it prescribed that signatures should 
be collected in the offices of the state or local administration (Art. 13) or 
electronically (Art. 15). However, after numerous protests by representatives 
of civil society, arguing against this, in their view, undemocratic solution, 
the government retreated and abandoned this particular provision.   
Prior to the publishing of the new draft LoR there was much discussion in 
Croatia concerning the possible introduction of thematic restrictions to 
what could be decided by means of direct democracy. In December 2013 
the Committee for the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political System 
of the Croatian Parliament initiated constitutional changes concerning 
the implementation of direct democracy. Accordingly, referendums 
and initiatives should not be allowed on issues that address: (i) limitations 
to human rights and basic freedoms as stipulated by headings II and III 
of the Croatian Constitution, (ii) obligations deriving from affiliation with 
international treaties as well as their cancelling, (iii) the state budget and 
the tax system, (iv) defence and national security, as well as (v) elections 
and appointments under the jurisdiction of the Croatian Parliament 
(Croatian Parliament 2013). 
Smerdel expressed his reservations concerning this proposal, which soon 
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after failed to obtain the needed support in the Parliament (2014: 42). In 
his view, if implemented, the proposal could create confusion because it 
avoids clarifying who will decide if some question falls within the ambit of 
the listed restrictions. Furthermore, he expressed opposition to the wording 
indicating that referendums would be forbidden on issues concerning human 
rights and basic freedoms as stipulated in headings II and III of Croatian 
Constitution. Namely, such a broad formulation, which concerns half of the 
constitutional text, would make direct democracy literally impossible (ibid). 
Similar reservations were expressed by Podolnjak, who proposed milder 
restrictions that would prevent the initiation of referendums and initiatives 
on matters that are contrary to international law, fundamental principles of 
democracy, the protection of human rights, basic freedoms, and the rule 
of law (2014: 211).12 The author also indicated that initiatives should not be 
allowed concerning the scope of the constitutional competences of one 
state body towards another. Finally, Podolnjak noted that the wording of the 
restrictions is of out-most importance in order to avoid broad interpretations 
of them, which could make direct democracy impossible (ibid). This is 
certainly of great importance because some commonly accepted notions 
– such as for example “state budget” – are so imprecise that their blank 
insertion on the list of restrictions could present an insuperable obstacle to 
direct democracy.  
Gardašević (2015: 44) and Kostadionov (2014: 132) also argued in favour of 
narrowing the area of questions that could be decided by means of direct 
democracy. Furthermore, Gardašević insisted on better regulation of the 
judicial review process that would cover all cases of referendum decision-
making and for the language to be more precise concerning procedural 
rules (2015: 44). Unfortunately, despite this comprehensive debate, the 
new draft LoR avoided introducing specific thematic restrictions to what 
could be decided by means of direct democracy. It only introduced a 
very general restriction indicating that referendums and initiatives cannot 
decide issues that could endanger the values of the Croatian constitutional 
order as prescribed by the Croatian Constitution and on issues that are 
contrary to the supremacy principle of EU law (Art. 3). 
According to a proposed draft law the authorities will not be in a position 
to change decisions reached by referendums or initiatives for a period of 
12  In accordance with the Code of Good Practice on Referendums (Council of Europe 2007). 
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two years. In the same period, it will not be possible to repeat a particular 
referendum or initiative (Art. 22). This is an improvement because in 
the current LoR (Art. 8) these limitations are set at one year concerning 
changing a decision and at six months concerning repeated voting. 
Furthermore, it should be underlined that according to the current LoR 
(Art. 8) a one-year suspension on a possibility to change a decision by 
representative bodies does not apply to decisions made by popular 
initiatives and to decisions made by referendums concerning alliances 
(dissolutions) with other states (see chapter 2). For the NGO GONG the 
proposed two-year extension is insufficient. They have argued that the 
initiatives are pointless if the authorities are allowed to alter the decisions 
reached by them after less than four years (Zelić and Berković 2014) – a 
view that is shared by the author of this article.
Among most contested aspects of the draft law is the maintenance of the 
old procedures with respect to the Constitutional Court and the checking 
of the compatibility between the question posed by the initiative and the 
Constitution (Art. 18). According to the trade union leader Mijat Stanić, 
checking the compatibility should have been envisaged in the earlier 
stages, before and not after the collection of the required number of 
signatures (Tportal.hr 2015).13 Podolnjak has the same view on this matter 
and he proposed that the organization committee of the initiative first 
collects 10.000 signatures, after which the Croatian Parliament would be 
given the opportunity to send an inquiry to the Court. In case the reply from 
the Court is positive the committee would continue with the collection of 
signatures (2014: 214).  
The draft law was criticized by the NGO GONG for failing to regulate 
the possibility of an agreement being reached between the organizing 
committee of an initiative and the authorities. Furthermore, the time 
frame that the public bodies have at their disposal for checking the 
validity of the citizens’ signatures was not specified, which, just as so 
far, protracts the process of implementing initiatives (Zelić and Berković 
2014). The new draft LoR also failed to introduce different requirements 
(quorums) for referendums and initiatives which pursue constitutional 
changes from those that request only legislative ones (Podolnjak 2014: 
13 It should, however, be noted that the great majority of national initiatives implemented in Croatia would be dismissed 
right from the start, without achieving the desired impact on the government, if the constitutionality of these questions 
was checked before the collection of signatures.   
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226). According to Podolnjak, a minimal acceptance quorum of 25% in 
case of a legislative referendum or initiative would be beneficial to the 
Croatian system. It would increase the legitimacy of decisions reached 
through direct democracy without endangering their implementation 
(ibid). Finally, the NGO GONG objected that the draft LoR lacks provisions 
concerning transparent financing of the referendum campaigns as well 
as signature collecting campaigns. They also indicated that this proposal 
failed to introduce clear media rules for impartial coverage of campaigns 
in the area of direct democracy (Zelić and Berković 2014). 
In late 2015 the new draft LoR was set to be sent to the Croatian Parliament for 
a second reading. However, the November 2015 general elections brought 
a defeat for the ruling socialdemocrats and January 2016 the new centre 
right coalition government was sworn. That meant that the faith of this latest 
legislative proposal was sealed. Right from the start the new conservative 
coalition was burdened with internal conflicts that ultimately ended up 
leading to a no-confidence vote for the prime minister and the dissolving of 
the Croatian Parliament in July 2016. The irregular parliamentary elections 
were held in September 2016, bringing some additional mandates for the 
main conservative party compared to the previous elections. Therefore, 
in October 2016 a new conservative coalition government was formed. 
Judging from the composition of the Croatian Parliament this government 
has a fair chance to be more stable than the previous one.
Conclusion
Direct democracy has always been a contested topic. However, today 
the prevailing dilemma is not whether or not it is beneficial for the overall 
development of democracy, but rather in what form. In this context, 
it is crucial to establish a procedural design for direct democracy that 
contributes to stability without compromising the democratic quality 
of a given political system. The experiences of Hungary, Lithuania 
and Slovenia are instructive for Croatia because they show the 
difficulties in finding the right position and scope for the constructive 
functioning of direct democracy. In Slovenia, where conditions for the 
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implementation of direct democracy are among the most liberal in the 
world, many initiatives have been held which are arguably not of crucial 
importance for the country (Kaučič 2014). This is a problem because 
direct democracy then unnecessarily burdens the state budget 
and produces polarization in society. On the other hand, imposing a 
participation quorum of at least 50%, as can be seen in the Lithuanian, 
the most recent Hungarian, as well as Croatian examples at the local 
level, blocks the efficient implementation of direct democracy with all 
of its democratic potential. In Slovenia and Hungary, the past practice 
of granting the right to start a referendum initiative to a minority group 
of parliamentarians (the opposition) was singled out as problematic, 
because it allowed initiatives to be used as a tool for settling differences 
between political parties (Vospernik 2014: 577; Kaučič 2014: 73). In other 
words, the initiatives were used for destabilizing the government instead 
of strengthening democracy from below. Although circumstances differ 
from country to country, these experiences should be kept in mind when 
thinking about the future legislative framework for the implementation of 
direct democracy in Croatia. 
In 2010 Croatia lowered the requirements for implementing national level 
referendums and initiatives in order to secure the passing of the politically 
important referendum on EU membership. This new situation assured the 
success of that particular referendum, but at the same time it let the “genie” 
of direct democracy “out of the bottle”. Since 2010 the national level 
initiatives increased in number and often confronted the government’s 
major reform programmes, which otherwise could have obtained majority 
backing in the Croatian Parliament. These initiatives, from the perspective 
of their organizers, could be viewed as successful, despite the fact that 
only one managed to be implemented in full. Namely, a number of these 
initiatives were so successful in their capacity to collect a large number 
of signatures that they persuaded the government to abandon its initial 
proposals, even before the expected decisions of the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, the practical impact of the recently undertaken 
initiatives in Croatia was that they preserved the status quo and blocked 
the unpopular but arguably needed reforms. Furthermore, they showed 
that Croatia, just as the other examined countries, lacks a legislative and 
institutional framework that supports dialogue and coordination between 
representative and direct democracy. 
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The new draft LoR launched in late 2014 was a long awaited action but in 
many aspects it has not been properly thought through, leaving numerous 
problems with respect to the implementation of direct democracy in 
Croatia unaddressed. It was arguably initially intended to diminish the 
enlarged power of direct democracy. However, it is questionable whether 
the general approach chosen by the (former) government in this latest 
legislative attempt was the most appropriate. It basically relied on reinforcing 
the technical requirements for the implementation of initiatives instead of 
posing thematic limitations to what can or cannot be decided through 
initiatives. The later approach would be just as, if not more legitimate, and 
it could be defended with the argument that all issues cannot be decided 
through direct democracy, which traditionally covers just a small part of 
legislative decision-making. Still, it should be underlined that with thematic 
limitations there is always a danger that their broad interpretations might 
make direct democracy impossible. Therefore, following recent practice in 
Slovenia, it could be concluded that Croatia needs very precisely defined 
limitations, particularly concerning terms such as “state budget” which 
cover vast areas of the government’s activities.
For the starting government the adoption of the new LoR represents a 
task it will certainly need to address, if for no other reason than to correct 
the current lack of coherence between the implementation of direct 
democracy at the national and local level. Looking at things from a 
broader perspective, the process of positioning direct democracy in 
Croatia as a mechanism for balancing and not always challenging the 
decisions of its representative democracy will take time. The instruments 
of direct democracy had not been earnestly introduced into the Croatian 
political system before the year 2010. Therefore, it is understandable 
that political actors in the country still search for the most appropriate 
positioning of direct democracy within the political system. One that allows 
it to become a tool for improving legislation and facilitating the efficient 
materialization of bottom-up initiatives, but simultaneously avoids installing 
it as a veto point on behalf of the status quo. As Croatia continues on 
this path the experiences of other countries could be valuable, but they 
cannot replace the learning process that primarily comes from practice. 
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